the State, in our June issue, we showed conclusively that the
theory is absurd; and that in the endeavor to escape the absurd
consequences of their position, the National Reform Party resort to a
fallacy which involves them in the inconsistency of holding beings
subject to that to which, according to the theory, they cannot be
subject. But we say again that we see no ground for hope that that
party will ever abandon either the fallacy or the absurdity. For, as the
theory is absurd, and as they affirm that the theory is fundamental to
this whole movement, it is evident that absurdity is inherent in the
whole National Reform system. That is not only the logic of the
question, but it is strictly in accordance with all the facts in the case.
The absurdity of the view that the State is a person distinct from
the individuals that compose it, is made more apparent when we
consider the obligations of a nation, or State, as such. Doctor Sloane
in a speech on this subject in the Cincinnati National Reform
Convention, instanced the fact that "Great Britain, France, Italy, and 
our own country own enormous debts." But we would inquire of the
National Reform Party, Does this personality, which you call the
State, of Great Britain, France, Italy, or the United States, own this
debt distinct from the people? and will it pay it distinct from the
people? When Germany laid upon France the war indemnity of five
milliards of francs, was it laid upon a "personality" distinct from the
individuals that compose the nation? and when it was paid was it paid
by such a distinct personality? To the minds of all reasonable men, to
ask these questions is to answer them. These National Reform
religio-political economists know as well as anybody does, that of the
war indemnity exacted from France by Germany, every franc came
from the people who compose the State, and not from some
hypothetical "individual personality" distinct from the people. They
know full well that every dollar of the national debt of our own country
that has ever been paid has been paid by the people of the United
States, and not a cent of it by any such theoretical absurdity as the
National Reform Party defines to be the State.
Does the National Reform Party mean to say that, when it gets its
iniquity framed by a law, and has thus perfected its idea of the
personality of a State, it will have the State a personality so entirely
distinct and separate from that of the people, that the State will pay
the national debt without any help on the part of the people? No. That
party itself, we do them the justice to suppose, would pronounce the
idea preposterous. And so do we. But if it be so, where is the sense
of all their argument about the personality of the State as distinct from
the personality of the people who compose the State? If the State has
a personality, an individuality of its own, and a soul of its own as
distinct from that of any or all of the people who compose it, as is that
of General Sherman or Mr. Blaine, then why can't it pay its debts
distinct from the people, as General Sherman or Mr. Blaine pays his?
The very idea is absurd.
Again, Prof. O. N. Stoddard, in the Cincinnati Convention, said:–
"If the character and liabilities of the State are not distinct from
those of its individual members, then the State is punished
hereafter in the persons of its subjects."
We would like Professor Stoddard or any other of the National
Reformers to show where a State has ever been or ever can be
punished, either here or hereafter, except in the persons of its
subjects. When France was punished for its ill-advised declaration of
war upon Germany, did the punishment fall upon the State distinct 
from the persons of its subjects? When Rome was punished for the
fearfulness of her iniquities–when from the Rhine and the Danube to
the deserts of Africa, and from the Black Sea and the Hellespont to
the wall of Antoninus and the Atlantic Ocean, the whole empire w