Do Assassinations Alter the Course of History?


SUBMITTED BY: nationalsun

DATE: Nov. 8, 2017, 6:59 a.m.

FORMAT: Text only

SIZE: 14.7 kB

HITS: 392

  1. Volume : SIRS 1991 History, Article 56
  2. Subject: Keyword(s) : KENNEDY and ASSASSINATION
  3. Title : Do Assassinations Alter the Course of History?
  4. Author : Simon Freeman and Ronald Payne
  5. Source : European
  6. Publication Date : May 24-26, 1991
  7. Page Number(s) : 9
  8. EUROPEAN
  9. (London, England)
  10. May 24-26, 1991, p. 9
  11. "Reprinted courtesy of THE EUROPEAN."
  12. DO ASSASSINATIONS ALTER THE COURSE OF HISTORY?
  13. by Simon Freeman and Ronald Payne
  14. India faces collapse with the violent death of Rajiv Gandhi--or
  15. does it? Simon Freeman and Ronald Payne analyse the importance of
  16. individuals in the march of events
  17. They have paid their tributes, expressed their horror and
  18. pledged, as they always do when one of their number is murdered,
  19. that democracy will triumph in the face of terrorism. Now, in
  20. their weekend retreats, with their foreign affairs advisers and
  21. their top secret intelligence reports, world leaders will have to
  22. judge the true impact on India of the assassination of Rajiv
  23. Gandhi.
  24. They will conclude, perhaps a little unhappily for them but
  25. fortunately for the rest of us, that Gandhi's death is unlikely
  26. to be more than a footnote, if a substantial one, in the history
  27. of his country. India will not disintegrate. There will be no
  28. civil war. The Indian military will not stage a coup. Pakistan
  29. will not launch the oft-predicted strike which would set the
  30. region ablaze.
  31. Some Indians, perhaps many, may die over the next month in
  32. the kind of primitive ethnic and religious feuding which has
  33. always threatened to destroy the country. But, unless history is
  34. truly mischievous, India will muddle through and get on with the
  35. business of trying to survive.
  36. It is rarely the personal stature of a statesman which
  37. decides how pivotal his contribution to history will be. History
  38. usually depends less on the drama of an assassination or the
  39. status of the victim than on more profound political, economic or
  40. demographic forces. In retrospect, it often appears that assassin
  41. and victim were inexorably drawn together to become the catalyst
  42. for inevitable change.
  43. The most spectacular assassination in modern European
  44. history--the shooting of Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife
  45. at Sarajevo in 1914 by a Serbian student, Gavrilo Princip--was
  46. undoubtedly the immediate cause of the First World War. But few
  47. serious historians today subscribe to the theory that, had
  48. Princip not pressed the trigger that late June day in the cause
  49. of Serbian nationalism, the 19th-century order would have
  50. survived.
  51. Dr Christopher Andrew, of Cambridge University, believes
  52. that the assassination merely set the timetable for war. He said:
  53. "Even if the Archduke had not been killed then there might have
  54. been a great war anyway." Other experts now talk not of Princip
  55. but of an explosive cocktail of nationalism straining within
  56. decrepit empires and of fatally dangerous alliances built by
  57. leaders from an earlier world.
  58. It is possible to see Sarajevo as the climax to a period in
  59. which political murders became almost routine. The reference
  60. books on late 19th-century Europe are peppered with the names of
  61. hapless, long-forgotten politicians who were shot, bombed or
  62. stabbed because, so it was thought by the many bands of
  63. extremists, that was the only way to force change.
  64. While there are no precise ways to assess the real
  65. importance of an assassination, historians like Andrew reckon
  66. that there are some general guidelines. In the stable, advanced
  67. democracies of today the murder of a top politician is unlikely
  68. to cause more than outrage and pain.
  69. When the Irish Republican Army blew up the Grand Hotel in
  70. Brighton in 1984 in an attempt to kill Prime Minister Margaret
  71. Thatcher and most of her Cabinet, they hoped that there would be
  72. such disgust at the murders that the British public would force
  73. their leaders to pull out of Northern Ireland. But, even if
  74. Thatcher had died this would not have happened. Her death would
  75. probably have strengthened her successor's resolve not to bow to
  76. terrorism.
  77. The IRA should have known this from the reaction to the
  78. killing five years earlier of Lord Louis Mountbatten,
  79. distinguished soldier, public servant and pillar of the British
  80. Establishment. The murder changed nothing in the province and
  81. only demonstrated, as if it was necessary, that determined
  82. terrorists often find ways to murder their chosen targets.
  83. Similarly, The Red Brigade anarchists who cold-bloodedly killed
  84. Aldo Moro, the Italian prime minister, in May, 1978, achieved
  85. nothing except to ensure that the Italian authorities would hunt
  86. them with even more determination. Nor did the killers of Swedish
  87. Prime Minister Olof Palme accomplish anything. The murder--still
  88. unsolved--drew the usual, but clearly genuine, shocked response
  89. from world leaders. But even at the time they were hardpressed to
  90. pretend that Palme's murder would fundamentally matter to Sweden.
  91. The Third World, on the other hand, is more volatile.
  92. Sometimes, as in India, countries are an uneasy blend of
  93. feudalism and capitalism, dynastic authoritarianism and
  94. democracy. The demise of dictators often leaves a bloody vacuum.
  95. Yet even here, the assassination of a tyrant does not necessarily
  96. signal major upheaval. General Zia ul-Haque, who had ruled
  97. Pakistan since 1977, was blown up in his plane in the summer of
  98. 1988. But, though he had long seemed crucial to the continuing
  99. stability of the country, his death seemed to be the fated climax
  100. to the era of military rule.
  101. The murder of Egypt's President Sadat in October 1981 seemed
  102. then to herald some new dark age of internal repression and
  103. aggression towards Israel. But his successor, Hosni Mubarak,
  104. merely edged closer to the Arab world without returning to the
  105. pre-Sadat hostility towards Israel.
  106. The killers of kings and dictators in other Arab countries
  107. have also discovered that they have murdered in vain. Iraq has
  108. endured a succession of brutal military dictators who have died
  109. as violently as they lived. The fact that Iraq has never
  110. experienced democracy is the result of economic and historical
  111. realities, not assassins' bullets. Saudi Arabia has also seen its
  112. share of high level killings yet, today, the House of Saud
  113. remains immovably in power.
  114. But in the United States, where the idea of righteous
  115. violence is deeply embedded in the national consciousness, the
  116. grand assassination has been part of the political process for
  117. more than a century. Beginning with the murder of President
  118. Abraham Lincoln in 1865, the list of victims is a long and
  119. distinguished one. It includes most recently, President John F.
  120. Kennedy in 1963; his brother, Robert, heir apparent, shot in
  121. 1968; Martin Luther King, civil rights campaigner and Nobel Peace
  122. Prize winner, gunned down the same year. Ronald Reagan could
  123. easily have followed in 1981 when he was shot and badly wounded.
  124. John Kennedy's death now appears important for different
  125. reasons from those one might have expected at the time. It did
  126. not derail any of his vaunted civil rights or welfare programmes;
  127. rather his death guaranteed that his successor, Lyndon Johnson,
  128. would be able to push the Kennedy blueprint for a New America
  129. through Congress. Nor did it end the creeping US involvement in
  130. Vietnam.
  131. But Kennedy has been immortalised by his assassin and the
  132. mythology of his unfulfilled promise will endure long after his
  133. real accomplishments are forgotten.
  134. In a curious, perverse, sense he and his fellow-martyrs
  135. might live on as far more potent symbols of change than if they
  136. had survived into gentle retirement with their fudges revealed
  137. and their frailties exposed.
  138. Why good leaders die and bad ones survive
  139. Few names of hated tyrants appear on the roll-call of world
  140. leaders who fall to the assassin's bomb, knife or bullet, writes
  141. Ronald Payne. One of the curiosities of the trade in political
  142. murder is that those the world generally recognises as bad guys
  143. often live to a ripe old age or die quietly in their beds. Few
  144. who mourn the passing of Rajiv Gandhi would have shed so many
  145. tears had President Saddam Hussein been blown to pieces in Iraq.
  146. There was a time only a few years ago when Americans and
  147. Europeans would have celebrated the violent demise of President
  148. Muammar Gaddafi. Both the Libyan leader and Hussein live on, as
  149. do Idi Amin of Uganda, or Fidel Castro, whom the American Central
  150. Intelligence Agency plotted so imaginatively and ineffectually to
  151. remove.
  152. When academics play the game of what might have been, the
  153. consequences of assassinating such monstres sacres as Stalin and
  154. Hitler arise.
  155. When the Russian dictator died suddenly of natural causes,
  156. the whole Soviet Union was paralysed because no leader dared
  157. claim the right to succeed him. That in itself suggests what
  158. might have happened had Stalin been shot unexpectedly at a more
  159. critical moment.
  160. The timing of a political murder is crucial. Had Adolf
  161. Hitler been assassinated before he achieved full power or before
  162. his invasion of the Soviet Union, the history of Germany, and
  163. indeed of Europe, would have been very different.
  164. Fascinating though such intellectual exercises are, it seems
  165. that as a rule it is the decent, the innocent and the relatively
  166. harmless who perish as assassins' victims.
  167. The reason may not be far to seek. Tyrants watch their backs
  168. pretty carefully. The secret police are ever active. It is easier
  169. to kill statesmen in democracies where the rule of law prevails
  170. and the sad truth is that leaders in those countries which
  171. exercise authority through voting rather than shooting are more
  172. at risk than Middle East tyrants.
  173. A further reason for the survival of the hated monster
  174. figure might be that Western intelligence services have been
  175. forbidden to go in for execution. The CIA and the British secret
  176. intelligence service are now out of the killing business. Even
  177. the KGB's assassination specialists seem to have been stood down.
  178. In any case the Kremlin was hardly keen on the murder of
  179. ruling statesmen even in the bad old days. Soviet leaders
  180. understood the realities of power well enough to know that such
  181. acts were unlikely to further their cause.

comments powered by Disqus